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This paper develops a contracting framework in order to explore the eﬀects of
credit derivatives on banks’ incentives to monitor loans, their incentives to inter-
vene, and, ultimately, borrowers’ incentives to perform. We show that (i) credit
derivatives with short term maturity strengthen incentives to intervene, incentives
to monitor, and managerial incentives to perform; (ii) while credit derivatives with
long term maturity weaken incentives to intervene, intervention incentives can be
maintained by sourcing more short term credit insurance; (iii) long term credit
insurance nevertheless weakens managerial incentives through a dilution eﬀect.
These ﬁndings suggest that properly designed credit derivatives strengthen mon-
itoring incentives and result in eﬃciency gains, rather than impeding economic
eﬃciency.
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Relationship Banking in the Age of Credit Derivatives
Executive Summary
Commercial banks increasingly rely on credit derivatives when seeking protection
against default risk. There is substantial debate among both practitioners and aca-
demics about the economic consequences of banks’ ever increasing reliance on credit
derivatives. The debate is centered around the following issues: (i) How does the
use of credit derivatives aﬀect banks’ incentives to monitor loans? In particular, does
credit insurance undermine banks’ monitoring incentives? (ii) Conversely, do banks
that enjoy default protection have excessive incentives to push their borrowers into
default and liquidation in order to collect the credit insurance payments? That is, will
the growth of the credit derivative market lead to an increased number of bankruptcies
and worsening ﬁrm performance?
This paper develops a contracting framework to explore these issues and to assess
the value contribution of credit derivatives. Our ﬁndings suggest that appropriately
designed credit insurance arrangements enhance (i) banks’ incentives to monitor bor-
rowing ﬁrms, i.e. to gather soft information about management’s decision making
and external inﬂuences aﬀecting the prospects of borrowers, (ii) banks’ incentives to
intervene following poor managerial performance, and (iii) managerial incentives to
perform.
The intuition behind these ﬁndings is easily understood when noting that credit
derivatives can have shorter maturities than the maturities of the underlying assets.
As such, credit derivatives can be targeted to improve a bank’s payoﬀ from “pulling
the plug”, i.e. terminating the project and liquidating its assets, before the project
reaches maturity. This will be of crucial importance whenever management must be
incentivized to take value–enhancing decisions. In contrast, if the bank did not source
short term credit insurance, its incentives to intervene would be limited as it would
have too little to gain (the assets’ liquidation value) from pre–maturely terminating
the project and too much to lose (the value of its long term claim in the ﬁrm).
Credit derivatives with short term maturity thus shift the balance between the costs
and beneﬁts of liquidation towards the beneﬁt side. This enhances the credibility of
termination threats imposed on management which in turn strengthens managerial
incentives to take value–enhancing decisions. Conversely, when management sticks to
value–maximizing decisions, the bank won’t have excessive incentives to intervene and
1terminate the ﬁrm. In this case, the bank is better oﬀ preserving the value of its long
term claim in the ﬁrm, rather than driving the borrower into default and collecting
the short term credit insurance payment.
These ﬁndings imply that banks also have stronger incentives to monitor borrowers
when sourcing credit derivatives (or credit insurance) with short term maturity. If
in the absence of short term credit insurance the bank were hesitant to liquidate the
ﬁrm following poor performance and forego its long term claim, then neither would
the bank have any incentives to inspect management’s decision making and external
inﬂuences aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s prospects. Only if monitoring eventually altered the
bank’s incentives to use this information at the interim intervention stage, would it
be worthwhile for the bank to engage in costly gathering of information.
Credit derivatives with long term maturity worsen banks’ incentives to intervene,
ceteris paribus. Yet intervention incentives can be maintained by sourcing more short
term credit insurance. This is because all what matters for intervention incentives
is the overall balance between the bank’s long term payoﬀ from keeping the ﬁrm as
going concern and its short term payoﬀ from “pulling the plug”. Nevertheless, long
term credit insurance worsens managerial incentives to perform through a dilution
eﬀect. When the bank sources long term credit insurance, long term ﬁrm value shifts
from the active bank to arm’s length credit insurance counterparties. While manage-
ment internalizes the eﬀects of its decision making on the active bank, it does not
take into account the externalities on arm’s length counterparties in credit deriva-
tive transactions. This implies that management cannot be compelled to stick to
value–maximizing decisions.
In sum, the economic analysis performed in this paper shows that strengthening
banks’ incentives to “play hardball” in debt restructuring through the sourcing of
credit derivatives with short term maturity is beneﬁcial in order to commit borrowers
to perform. Moreover, enhancing banks’ bargaining position in debt restructurings is
a prerequisite for banks to have incentives to monitor loans and to play a meaningful
role in restructurings. Most importantly, our ﬁndings suggest that banks’ increased
incentive to “pull the plug” does not result in an increased number of defaults, to the
contrary, it improves ﬁrm performance and hence reduces default risk.
21 Introduction
Commercial banks increasingly rely on credit derivatives when seeking protection
against default risk. The British Bankers’ Association estimates that by the end
of 1999 the global market for credit derivatives reached USD 568bn (BBA 2000).
The Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency reports that in the third quarter of
2001, US commercial banks held credit derivatives with a notional amount of USD
360bn, representing a more than 6–fold increase since 1997 (OCC 2001). To put
these numbers into perspective, the overall market for derivative contracts in the US
amounted to USD 51 trillion. Credit derivatives thus represent less than one percent
of the overall market for derivative contracts. However, the market for derivatives
increased only 2–fold from 1997 to 2001. Thus, relative to other derivative products,
the market for credit derivatives is still at its infancy but growing at rapid pace.1
There is substantial debate among both practitioners and academics about the
economic consequences of banks’ ever increasing reliance on credit derivatives (see,
among others, Kiﬀ and Morrow 2000, Scott–Quinn and Walmsley 1998, Tavakoli 2001,
and Euromoney 2002).2 The debate is centered around three issues: (i) How does the
use of credit derivatives aﬀect banks’ incentives to monitor loans? In particular, does
credit insurance undermine banks’ monitoring incentives? (ii) Conversely, do banks
enjoying default protection have excessive incentives to push their borrowers into
default and liquidation?3 That is, will the growth of the credit derivative market lead
to an increased number of bankruptcies and worsening ﬁrm performance? (iii) What
is the appropriate deﬁnition of an event triggering a payment from the protection
seller to a protection buyer? Should a protection buyer be able to collect a payment
only if the reference entity defaults? Or should a payment be triggered when the
reference entity enters restructuring? Would the former option induce banks to forego
restructuring options and thus foster asset destruction?
This paper develops a formal framework to explore these issues and to assess the
value contribution of credit derivatives. The framework elaborates on the interaction
between a ﬁrm in need of outside funding, a bank, and an arm’s length third party
credit insurer.4 The bank’s role is to provide funding and to monitor the ﬁrm’s
management. Monitoring enables the bank to obtain information about management’s
1During 2000–2002, there were a number of instances where restructuring or default of reference
entities triggered credit protection payments. Examples include Conseco, SAirGroup, Railtrack,
Edison, Comdisco, K–Mart, Armstrong, and Enron.
2Other useful references include credit derivatives specials in CreditRisk, March 2001, and Deriva-
tives Strategy, January 2001.
3For example, Scott–Quinn and Walmsley 1998 argue that “a situation could be envisaged where
a bank which has credit protection might choose to ‘play hard–ball’ to maximize its recovery, secure in
the knowledge that if it does tip the borrower into bankruptcy it is covered by its credit protection. One
possibility might be a bank which has covenants in a loan which normally it might consider waiving.
It might decide not to waive them, in order to trigger a default and collect on its protection.” (p. 46)
4One reason why credit derivatives diﬀer from credit insurance is that under credit insurance the
protection buyer has to own the underlying asset (in particular, the protection buyer must prove loss
before making a claim). This is not the case with a credit derivative, which may be held for purely
speculative reasons. This diﬀerence plays no role in our setting.
3decision making and external inﬂuences aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s prospects. By expending
eﬀort (working hard, choosing the right project, etc.), management enhances the long
term success prospects of the ﬁrm. The role of the credit insurer is to provide the
bank with short term and/or long term credit protection (for example, by oﬀering the
bank a credit–default swap, which promises the bank a payment should the borrower
default in exchange for a ﬁxed premium).5 Within this framework, we will analyze
the eﬀects of credit derivatives (or credit insurance) on (i) the bank’s incentives to
monitor the ﬁrm, i.e. to gather information about management’s decision making and
external inﬂuences aﬀecting loan performance; (ii) its incentives to intervene following
poor managerial performance and liquidate the ﬁrm at an interim liquidation stage;
and, ultimately, (iii) managerial incentives to perform.
Our central ﬁnding is that appropriately designed credit derivatives enhance banks’
incentives to monitor, their incentives to intervene, and managerial incentives to per-
form. While counterintuitive at ﬁrst sight, the intuition behind this result is straight-
forward when noting that credit derivatives can have shorter maturities than the
maturities of the underlying assets. As such, credit derivatives can be targeted to im-
prove the bank’s payoﬀ at the interim liquidation stage. In particular, credit deriva-
tives with short term maturity shift the balance between what the bank has to lose
and what it has to gain from intervening and liquidating the borrower towards the
beneﬁt side. Short term credit insurance thus strengthens the credibility of a threat
to liquidate the ﬁrm should management show poor performance. This enhances
the bank’s ability to incentivize management to choose value maximizing decisions,
rather than behaving opportunistically. In contrast, if the bank did not source short
term credit insurance, its incentives to respond to poor performance with intervention
would be limited, as it would have too much to lose (its long term claim in the ﬁrm)
but too little to gain (the assets’ collateral value) from liquidating the ﬁrm and seiz-
ing its assets. While short term credit insurance strengthens intervention incentives,
the credit insurer’s break even constraint ensures that the bank won’t have excessive
incentives to liquidate. Credit derivatives with short term maturity thus introduce an
additional degree of freedom, which allows to optimize the balance between too soft
and excessive incentives to intervene.
Credit derivatives with long term maturity weaken incentives to intervene, ceteris
paribus. This is because they shift the balance between the costs and beneﬁts of
intervention towards the cost side. However, intervention incentives can be main-
tained by sourcing more short term credit insurance. Nevertheless, long term credit
insurance worsens managerial incentives to perform through a dilution eﬀect. While
management is full residual claimant with respect to the bank as long as intervention
threats are credible, management does not internalize the negative externalities poor
performance impose on the (arm’s length) credit insurance counterparties. Long term
credit insurance thus distorts managerial incentives by diluting inside claims.
Credit derivatives with short term (long term) maturity strengthen (weaken) in-
5See e.g. Tavakoli 2001 and Euromoney 2002 for descriptions of diﬀerent credit derivative instru-
ments used in practice.
4centives to engage in costly monitoring, i.e. to gather information about the ﬁrm’s
prospects. In our setting, monitoring incentives stem from preventing management
to continue the ﬁrm in bad states of the world. Short term credit insurance strength-
ens monitoring incentives as it improves the bank’s payoﬀ from liquidating the ﬁrm.
Conversely, long term credit insurance worsens monitoring incentives as it protects
the bank against long term credit risk. Yet, while these features explain why the bank
would engage in costly monitoring (if it cannot a priori commit to monitor), it does
not explain why the parties would envision a mechanism that commits the bank to
monitor. Sourcing short term credit insurance or altering the bank’s ﬁnancial claim
on the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows in order to commit the bank to monitor is justiﬁed only if
monitoring and intervention threats strengthen managerial incentives to perform. The
analysis thus points to a complementarity between enhancing outside investors’ mon-
itoring incentives and strengthening managerial performance incentives. Monitoring
incentives can be further strengthened by increasing the riskiness of the bank’s long
term ﬁnancial claim. This can be achieved through equity ﬁnancing or “reverse” credit
insurance (i.e. the bank making a payment to the counterparty should the borrower
default on a long term claim).
Our research adds to several strands of the literature. In a seminal contribution,
Diamond (1984) points to the role of loan portfolio diversiﬁcation in ﬁnancial interme-
diation and delegated monitoring. Diversiﬁcation allows to minimize bank insolvency
risk and hence to avoid deadweight bankruptcy costs. Yet, monitoring incentives
are maintained as banks are fully exposed to individual credit risks. Eﬃciency gains
stemming from loan portfolio diversiﬁcation and delegated monitoring are passed on
to the originators of real investment projects, thus fostering value creation.
Building on Diamond’s insight, a large literature explores the costs and beneﬁts
of diverse risk management techniques in banking when diversiﬁcation is subject to
limits or costly and banks face ﬁnancing constraints (see, among others, Carlstrom
and Samolyk 1995, Duﬀee and Zhou 2001, Froot and Stein 1998, Gorton and Pennachi
1995, and James 1988). For example, Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) show that a capital
constrained bank, which seeks to transfer loan portfolio risk to outside parties through
loan sales, may want to retain part of its loan portfolio to preserve its monitoring
incentives. Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) demonstrate that a capital constrained bank
may want to use credit derivatives in risk transfers, rather than relying on loan sales.
They show that credit derivatives make it easier for a bank to circumvent the “lemons”
problem caused by banks’ superior information about the credit quality of their loans.
Our framework deliberately abstracts from ﬁnancing constraints at the bank level.
This is not to dispute that ﬁnancing constraints and bankruptcy deadweight costs
provide important motivations for banks to source insurance against credit risk.6
6Our framework also abstracts from regulatory capital arbitrage issues. Under current capital
adequacy regulation, banks have to put aside regulatory capital for individual credit risks, even
if individual credit risks reduce aggregate loan portfolio risk. Thus, banks may want to get rid
of individual credit risks in order to relieve their regulatory capital constraints. See, for example,
Tavakoli 2001 for further discussion of regulatory capital arbitrage issues arising in practice.
5Rather, the objective of our paper is to show that credit insurance has important
eﬀects on bank–borrower relationships for reasons other than ﬁnancing constraints at
the bank level and bankruptcy deadweight costs.
We depart from much of the bank monitoring literature in that our framework
opens up the monitoring “black box”.7 In particular, we distinguish between mon-
itoring and intervention incentives. In our setting, monitoring refers to gathering
soft information about a ﬁrm’s decision making and external inﬂuences aﬀecting the
ﬁrm’s prospects. The question how investors use this information is diﬀerent from the
question how to incentivize investors to acquire information in the ﬁrst place. Inter-
vention refers to using information obtained through monitoring in order to discipline
management. By distinguishing between monitoring and intervention incentives (and
endogenizing both of them), we are able to derive novel insights about the merits of
credit insurance in relationship banking.
The present paper is related to Rajan and Winton (1995), who discuss the impact
of covenants and collateral on a bank’s incentives to engage in monitoring. They show
that covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a
lender’s incentives to monitor in order to prevent ineﬃcient continuation. This diﬀers
from our setting where preventing ineﬃcient continuation alone is not suﬃcient as
to justify providing the bank with additional collateral (through sourcing short term
credit insurance). Rather, the beneﬁts of short term credit insurance stem from im-
proving managerial incentives to perform through enhancing the bank’s incentives to
monitor and to intervene. Manove et al. (2001) point to the downside of collateral
protection. They show that strong creditor protection may lead to circumstances
in which cheap credit is inappropriately emphasized over project screening. Restric-
tions on collateral requirements can redress this imbalance and increase credit–market
eﬃciency.8
This paper also draws on the corporate ﬁnance literature on hardening ﬁrms’
budget constraints (Bergl¨ of and von Thadden 1994, Bolton and Scharfstein 1996,
Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, Hart and Moore 1995, 1998, Repullo and Suarez 1998).
For example, Bergl¨ of and von Thadden (1994) show that separating short–term and
long–term claims and allocating these claims to diﬀerent classes of investors allows
to commit management not to hold up investors ex post. Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994) point to the role of debt and equity in balancing outside investors’ intervention
incentives. Hart and Moore (1995) also point to the merits of “hard claims” (e.g. senior
7For example, in Diamond 1984 and Besanko and Kanatas 1993, “monitoring” refers to committing
management to ﬁrst best actions. In Gorton and Pennachi 1995, “monitoring” refers to enhancing
the long term value of a loan. In Holmstr¨ om and Tirole 1997, “monitoring”, if taken literally, refers
to reducing management’s private beneﬁts from shirking. This may be best interpreted as providing
management with advice or interfering with managerial decision making. Our approach is more in
line with e.g. von Thadden 1995, Rajan 1992, and Repullo and Suarez 1998, where monitoring refers
to gathering “soft” information.
8Their argument mirrors ours that long term credit insurance may undermine monitoring and
intervention incentives (we show, however, that this problem can be addressed through the bank
sourcing more short term credit insurance).
6debt) in committing outsiders to intervene and in constraining management. Closest
related to our framework, Repullo and Suarez (1998) demonstrate that multiple source
ﬁnancing and collateral help to improve the disciplinary power of liquidation threats
and thus to strengthen managerial performance incentives. Our analysis suggests that
short term credit insurance can eﬀectively serve as a substitute for collateral.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the formal framework and the
main assumptions. Section 3 explore the eﬀects of credit derivatives with short term
and long term maturity on incentives to intervene. Section 4 explores a bank’s in-
centives to monitor when sourcing credit insurance. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are
relegated to the appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Informal Overview
The framework elaborates on the ﬁnancing relationship between a ﬁrm in need of
outside funding and a bank which may source short or long term credit insurance
from a third party. The ﬁrm’s investment project generates long term returns; at an
interim stage the ﬁrm’s assets may be liquidated. Long term credit insurance reduces
the bank’s exposure to long term credit risk, while short term credit insurance is meant
to improve the bank’s payoﬀ from liquidating the ﬁrm at the interim stage (this feature
will be discussed in detail below). The ﬁrm is run by a management team whose role
is to work hard and ensure that the project is successful. By monitoring the ﬁrm, the
bank observes management’s decision making and external inﬂuences aﬀecting the
ﬁrm’s prospects. Within this framework, we explore how short and long term credit
insurance aﬀects (i) the bank’s incentives to monitor, (ii) its incentives to intervene
at the interim stage, and ultimately, (iii) managerial incentives to perform.
2.2 Agents, Timing, and Information
There are three agents: a ﬁrm with zero internal funds, a bank with deep pockets,
and a third party, referred to as the credit insurer. The ﬁrm is in need of outside
funding, which is to be provided by the bank. The credit insurer’s role is to oﬀer
the bank protection against default risk. All parties are risk neutral and there is no
discounting. There are four dates, t = 0;1;2;3. The timing of events is summarized
in ﬁgure 1.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
invest I > 0 eﬀort e 2 [0;1] – interim signal
– monitoring
– continue or liquidate




Π with prob. µe
0 with prob. 1 ¡ µe
Figure 1: Timing
7At t = 0, the ﬁrm has to ﬁnance a ﬁxed investment outlay I. At t = 1, the ﬁrm’s man-
agement/owner expends privately costly eﬀort e 2 [0;1] (examples include working
hard, choosing the right project, ﬁnding out what customers want, etc.). The eﬀort
cost function Ã(e) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and convex,
and satisﬁes the following standard regularity conditions: Ã(0) = 0, Ã0(0) = 0, and
lime!1 Ã0(e) = 1. The more eﬀort management expends at this stage, the larger will
be the likelihood that the ﬁrm will be successful when ﬁnal and veriﬁable cash ﬂows
realize at t = 3. From an ex ante perspective, the ﬁrm is successful with probability
µe in which case it generates cash ﬂows Π > I. With probability 1¡µe, the ﬁrm fails
and cash ﬂows are zero.
Apart from providing ﬁnancing, a key role of the bank is to monitor the ﬁrm. This
involves visiting the ﬁrm, inspecting management’s decision making, and evaluating
external inﬂuences aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s prospects. The bank’s ability to commit to such
monitoring activities will be discussed in more detail below. Monitoring enables the
bank to obtain two critical pieces of information, (i) management’s decision making
(i.e. its eﬀort expended at t = 1), and (ii) external inﬂuences aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s
prospects. Formally, with probability 1¡µ, management and the bank (if it monitors)
receive a bad signal at t = 2, indicating that cash ﬂows will be zero with probability
one. For example, the ﬁrm’s innovation may leak to a competitor, a competitor may
come up with a superior product, or potential customers may turn out to be no longer
interested in the ﬁrm’s product. These events would severely undermine the ﬁrm’s
prospects. With probability µ, the parties receive a good signal, indicating that the
ﬁrm will be successful with probability e and fail with probability 1 ¡ e. In what
follows, we will frequently refer to the realization of the good signal as the good state
and the realization of the bad signal as the bade state. While both management
and the bank can observe eﬀort and the interim signal, neither eﬀort nor the interim
signal are veriﬁable in court (information obtained through monitoring is soft). This
precludes conditioning ﬁnancial contracts on either eﬀort or the signal.
The ﬁrm’s assets have a liquidation value L at t = 2, where 0 < L < I, and zero
liquidation value at t = 3. Hence, conditional on the parties receiving the bad signal,
it is eﬃcient to liquidate the ﬁrm’s assets and deploy them elsewhere. Conditional on
the good signal, the ﬁrm’s going concern value is given by eΠ, while its liquidation
value is given by L. Hence, liquidation is ineﬃcient if and only if e ¸ L=Π. The ﬁrst
best eﬀort level eFB is given by the solution of µΠ ¡ Ã0(e) = 0. In order to make
the analysis interesting, we assume that liquidation is ineﬃcient, conditional on the
good signal and ﬁrst best eﬀort, eFBΠ > L. Furthermore, the ﬁrm’s net present value
under the ﬁrst best is strictly positive,
µeFBΠ + (1 ¡ µ)L ¡ I ¡ Ã(eFB) > 0 (1)
While eﬀort and the interim signal are observable by the “insiders”, i.e. management
and the bank, the credit insurer observes neither piece of information. In other words,
there is asymmetric information between the credit insurer and the insiders. Finally,
8there is perfect competition in the banking and credit insurance markets. Hence, in
equilibrium, both the bank and the credit insurer just break even.
2.3 Monitoring vs Intervention Incentives
In our framework, there will be an important diﬀerence between incentives to mon-
itor (i.e. to gather information) and incentives to intervene (i.e. to use information
obtained through monitoring). In order to elaborate on this feature we will ﬁrst
assume that the bank can commit to monitor the ﬁrm and subsequently drop this
assumption. If the bank can commit to monitor, it expends some (small) cost c > 0
at t = 0, after having funded the ﬁrm. This can be interpreted as an investment into
the bank’s monitoring ability. Once the monitoring expense is sunk, the bank is able
to monitor at zero cost (and management knows that it will be monitored). Under
the no–commitment regime, the bank is unable to commit to monitor. Formally, af-
ter management has made its eﬀort decision and after the realization of the interim
signal, the bank has to decide whether to inspect the ﬁrm at a cost c > 0 or whether
to leave the ﬁrm unmonitored. In our framework, monitoring will be worthwhile for
two reasons:
1. Provided the bank is granted the right to liquidate the ﬁrm, it can condition its
decision whether to “pull the plug” and terminate the ﬁrm on management’s
eﬀort choice. In particular, the bank may use the right to liquidate as a threat
point in renegotiation in order to extract a higher payment from the ﬁrm should
it observe that management shirked. As a result, management will internalize
the cost of shirking imposed on the bank and, consequently, will be less inclined
to shirk. We assume that the ﬁrm has the entire bargaining power in renegoti-
ation. This assumption allows to abstract from a hold up problem ` a la Rajan
(1992) and thus to focus on the merits of liquidation threats as a disciplinary
device. Crucially, however, termination threats may lack credibility. A key nov-
elty of the paper is to show how the use credit derivatives aﬀects the credibility
of termination threats.
2. Monitoring also enables the bank to prevent management from continuing the
ﬁrm in the bad state. We consider that if management is left unmonitored, it
would never self–liquidate the ﬁrm.9 Hence, as will be shown below, monitoring
ensures eﬃcient liquidation decisions.
2.4 Contracts
Rather than imposing speciﬁc classes of contracts, we adopt the strategy to derive
the optimal contracts and to match these contracts with ﬁnancial contracts used in
9This may or may not stem from managerial private beneﬁts. In particular, in our setting, the
parties may want to manipulate the ﬁnancial contract such that management has incentives to con-
tinue in the bad state, if left unmonitored. This will be beneﬁcial in order to commit the bank to
monitor.
9practice. Liquidation at t = 2 and ﬁnal cash ﬂows at t = 3 are veriﬁable. Hence,
contracts will condition on these variables. A credit contract between the bank and the
ﬁrm speciﬁes long term payments RH and RL from the bank to the ﬁrm, conditional
on the high and the low cash ﬂow state, respectively.10 Without loss of generality,
suppose the bank does not invest more than I and is granted the option to liquidate
the ﬁrm at t = 2 and to seize its assets.11
A credit insurance contract between the bank and the credit insurer speciﬁes a
premium P to be paid by the bank at t = 0, long term credit insurance payments
CH and CL from the credit insurer to the bank (conditional on t = 3 cash ﬂow
realizations), and a short term insurance payment C0 if the bank liquidates at t = 2.
The bank’s total expense at t = 0 is thus given by I+P. It is relatively unimportant for
the analysis whether short term credit insurance payments condition on liquidation
or on default, as long as the bank does not lose its credit insurance claims if it
liquidates the ﬁrm after default.12 If short term credit insurance contracts conditioned
on default, one would have to specify an additional short term debt repayment such
that the borrower must default if credit terms are not renegotiated prior to t = 2 (and
after the bank monitored). The bank has then the option to induce default, collect
the credit insurance payment (in which case it must transfer its cash ﬂow rights to the
credit insurer), and liquidate the ﬁrm. Alternatively, the bank can either renegotiate
credit terms with the borrower as to avoid default or renegotiate after default, forego
the credit insurance payment, and keep its claim on the ﬁrm. For the rest of the
paper, we adopt the convention that short term credit insurance contracts condition
on liquidation, rather than on default.
The ﬁrm is protected by limited liability (it cannot pay out more than it has). In
contrast, the bank is not protected by limited liability (it has deep pockets). In partic-
ular, we allow for negative payments from the credit insurer to the bank (e.g. CL < 0).
We restrict, however, attention to credit insurance contracts with a non–negative pre-
mium, i.e. P ¸ 0. As is standard in models with multiple investors, we exclude
10In addition, one could specify a short term payment R0 if the ﬁrm is liquidated at t = 2. From
the ﬁrm’s wealth constraint such a payment would have to be non–positive, and, hence, it would
only put a burden on the bank’s incentives to intervene. Thus, R0 = 0 will be optimal. A diﬀerent
question is how to interpret the class of contracts under consideration. As in Rajan (1992), one may
want to specify some short term credit payment in order to induce default at t = 2. Standard short
term debt would then give the bank the right to intervene and to liquidate.
11This will be optimal in our framework. We exclude partial liquidation or the parties committing
to a randomization device. Extending the model along those lines would not alter its qualitative
insights.
12If bankruptcy were costly for management, the bank could very well transfer cash ﬂow and liq-
uidation rights to the credit insurer after default and collection of the credit insurance payment
(furthermore, the bank could lose its claim on the credit insurer if it liquidated). Bankruptcy fre-
quently imposes deadweight costs on ﬁrms as customers and suppliers are typically reluctant to engage
in further transactions with a ﬁrm once the ﬁrm ﬁled for bankruptcy (Opler and Titman 1994, Tit-
man 1984). Hence, once the ﬁrm declared bankruptcy, it might be most eﬃcient to proceed with
liquidation. It is then up to the bank to waive its short term debt claims in order to avoid this
adverse event. Short term credit insurance enhances the bank’s bargaining power in short term debt
renegotiations.
10renegotiation between the bank and the third party credit insurer. In particular, the
bank cannot impose a threat on the credit insurer to liquidate the ﬁrm, extract a
payment from the credit insurer, and subsequently let the ﬁrm continue (and keep its
claim on the ﬁrm). This can be motivated on several grounds: (i) since the credit
insurer is at arm’s length, renegotiation between the credit insurer and the bank will
be impeded by asymmetric information; (ii) without loss of generality, one could al-
low the bank to source default protection from many credit insurers. Presumably,
renegotiation with all of those credit insurers would be very cumbersome and costly
for the bank. Hence, sourcing credit insurance from many parties would commit the
bank not to hold up credit insurers ex post;13 (iii) the credit insurer could have the
bargaining power over the bank, in which case the hold up problem would not arise
in the ﬁrst place.
3 Incentives to Intervene
This section elaborates on how credit derivatives (or credit insurance) aﬀect the bank’s
incentives to intervene when it can commit to monitor. First, the optimal credit
contract between the bank and the ﬁrm in the absence of credit derivatives is derived.
We will show then how credit derivatives allow to improve the bank’s intervention
incentives.
3.1 Contracting in the absence of credit insurance
Suppose the bank does not source credit insurance and commits to monitor by in-
curring the monitoring cost c. Since the bank has the choice between liquidating the
ﬁrm’s assets or letting the ﬁrm continue, the bank has to decide what to do after
having observed management’s eﬀort and the interim signal. If the bank liquidates,
its payoﬀ will be given by L. If the bank does not liquidate after having received the
good signal, its payoﬀ will amount to eRH + (1 ¡ e)RL. After the bad signal, if the
bank does not liquidate, its payoﬀ will be given by RL. Thus, to ensure that the bank
liquidates in the bad state we must have L ¸ RL. To ensure that the bank does not
liquidate in the good state, given management’s equilibrium eﬀort level e¤¤, we need
e¤¤RH + (1 ¡ e¤¤)RL ¸ L (2)
Suppose that in equilibrium the liquidation policy is eﬃcient. Then, for the bank to
break even, we must have
µ(e¤¤RH + (1 ¡ e¤¤)RL) + (1 ¡ µ)L ¸ I + c (3)
We will now show that a threat to terminate following a small deviation from the
equilibrium eﬀort level cannot be credible when the bank does not source credit in-
surance. Suppose, to the contrary, that a threat to terminate is credible. Hence, for
13An arm’s length relationship between the credit insurer and the bank is equally important as to
avoid collusion at the expense of the ﬁrm. Credit derivatives constitute such arm’s length ﬁnancial
instruments.
11any e < e¤¤, the bank’s payoﬀ from continuation must not be larger than its payoﬀ
from liquidation. Formally, for any e < e¤¤,
eRH + (1 ¡ e)RL · L (4)
Thus, from (2) and by continuity,
e¤¤RH + (1 ¡ e¤¤)RL = L (5)
and RH ¸ RL. From (3), L ¸ I + c, which contradicts L < I. Therefore, a threat
to liquidate following a small deviation from the equilibrium eﬀort level cannot be
credible:
Lemma 1 Suppose the bank does not source credit insurance. Then, as long as the
bank breaks even in equilibrium, a threat to intervene and liquidate the ﬁrm following
a small deviation from the equilibrium eﬀort level lacks credibility.
Intuitively, the bank has too much to lose and too little to gain from liquidating the ﬁrm
following a small deviation from the equilibrium eﬀort level. If it decided to liquidate,
the bank would lose its stake in the ﬁrm, which in equilibrium is just suﬃcient to
compensate the bank for its initial investment. It would gain the liquidation proceeds
but these are not suﬃcient for the bank to be willing to forego its stake in the ﬁrm.
The lemma implies that the bank would not use the termination option as a
threat point in renegotiation if management picked an eﬀort level slightly lower than
the equilibrium eﬀort level e¤¤. Hence, around e¤¤ management’s payoﬀ is given by
µ(e(Π ¡ RH) ¡ (1 ¡ e)RL) ¡ Ã(e) (6)
The equilibrium eﬀort level is thus characterized by the standard incentive constraint,
µ(Π ¡ RH + RL) ¡ Ã0(e¤¤) = 0 (7)
Suppose that RH > RL at the optimum (i.e. the ﬁrst best eﬀort level is not achievable).
Hence, an optimal contract will minimize RH ¡ RL subject to the bank’s break even
constraint and the two limited liability constraints, RH · Π and RL · 0. The solution
to this problem is RL = 0 and
RH =
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
µe¤¤ > 0 (8)
The following proposition characterizes the optimal contract and the equilibrium eﬀort
level when the bank does not source credit insurance:
Proposition 1 Suppose the bank does not source credit insurance. Then, if outside
funding is feasible, the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced with debt, giving the bank a senior claim on
the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows,
R =
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
µe¤¤ (9)
12The bank has the right to call the loan and seize the ﬁrm’s assets if the ﬁrm cannot
fulﬁll its payment obligations. Management’s equilibrium eﬀort level is given by the
largest solution of
µΠ ¡
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
e¤¤ ¡ Ã0(e¤¤) = 0; (10)
The ﬁrm is liquidated in the bad state and continued in the good state.
Monitoring and the bank’s liquidation rights’ only role is to avoid ineﬃcient continu-
ation in the bad state. They play no role in terms of disciplining management. Under
monitoring, the surplus is given by
µe¤¤Π + (1 ¡ µ)L ¡ I ¡ c ¡ Ã(e¤¤) (11)
Conversely, if the bank did not monitor the ﬁrm, the surplus would be given by
µe¤¤(0)Π ¡ I ¡ Ã(e¤¤(0)) (12)
where e¤¤(0) denotes the equilibrium eﬀort level if the bank does not monitor. Hence,
the surplus gain from monitoring is given by (1 ¡ µ)L ¡ c, and the eﬃciency gains
stemming from management’s improved incentives due to the lower outside ﬁnancing
burden.14 Monitoring is thus eﬃcient as long as the monitoring cost c is suﬃciently
small. However, outside ﬁnancing may not be feasible (in which case monitoring is
obviously ineﬃcient). While launching the project is eﬃcient under the ﬁrst best, it
may well be ineﬃcient to launch the project under the second best. In what follows,
we will show how credit insurance allows to address this problem.
3.2 Credit insurance
Preliminaries: A credit insurance contract speciﬁes a premium P, to be paid at
t = 0, a payment C0 from the credit insurer to the bank if the ﬁrm is liquidated,
and payments CL and CH if the ﬁrm is continued, conditional on the low and high
cash ﬂow state, respectively. In order to ensure that the bank liquidates the ﬁrm
in the bad state, we must have L + C0 ¸ RL + CL. In the good state, the bank
must not liquidate in equilibrium. Letting e¤ denote the equilibrium eﬀort level, the
corresponding incentive constraint amounts to
e¤(RH + CH) + (1 ¡ e¤)(RL + CL) ¸ L + C0 (13)
Thus, for the bank just to break even,
µ(e¤(RH + CH) + (1 ¡ e¤)(RL + CL)) + (1 ¡ µ)(L + C0) = I + P + c (14)
Conversely, for the credit insurer just to break even,
µ(e¤CH + (1 ¡ e¤)CL) + (1 ¡ µ)C0 = P (15)
14Conversely, when (1 ¡ µ)L < c, the eﬃciency loss from monitoring is given by the direct loss
(1 ¡ µ)L ¡ c and the loss stemming from worse performance through the higher outside ﬁnancing
burden. This has an important implication for the role of credit insurance in terms of enhancing the
bank’s monitoring incentives, which will be discussed in detail in section 4.
13Suppose e¤ > e¤¤, otherwise sourcing credit insurance would be pointless in our frame-
work. Therefore, a threat to liquidate the ﬁrm must be credible for any “downwards”
deviation from e¤. Formally, for any e < e¤,
e(RH + CH) + (1 ¡ e)(RL + CL) · L + C0 (16)
Hence, from (13) and by continuity,
e¤(RH + CH) + (1 ¡ e¤)(RL + CL) = L + C0 (17)
and RH +CH ¸ RL +CL. Therefore, from (14), L+C0 = I +P +c. Substituting P
from the credit insurer’s break even constraint (15), the short term credit insurance
payment thus amounts to
C0 = e¤CH + (1 ¡ e¤)CL +
I + c ¡ L
µ
(18)
This analysis has two important implications: (i) short term credit insurance im-
proves the bank’s incentives to intervene, i.e. strenghtens the credibility of termina-
tion threats (note that P ¸ 0 and I + c > L imply that C0 > 0). Intuitively, short
term credit insurance is like providing additional collateral, and the more valuable is
collateral, the more the bank has to gain from liquidating; (ii) in order to preserve the
bank’s incentives to intervene when sourcing long term credit insurance, short term
credit insurance must be positively correlated with long term credit insurance (the
short term credit insurance payment is increasing in the long term credit insurance
payments CL and CH). Long term credit insurance ceteris paribus worsens the bank’s
incentives to intervene as it has more to lose from liquidating (namely the long term
credit insurance payments). Hence, if the bank sources long term credit insurance, it
has to source more short term credit insurance in order to preserve its intervention
incentives.
Note too that short term credit insurance is increasing in I + c but decreasing in
L. This is because when I +c is large, the bank must be promised a fairly large stake
in the ﬁrm. This shifts the balance between the beneﬁts and the costs of liquidation
towards the cost side. Conversely, if L is large, the bank already has quite a bit
to gain from liquidating. Hence, the additional short term credit insurance payment
needed to close the credibility gap is rather small. Finally, short term credit insurance
is increasing in the cash ﬂow riskiness of the ﬁrm (the inverse of the likelihood of
the good state). In our setting, this does not stem from the bank’s own ﬁnancing
constraints, but from the fact that when the likelihood of the good state is small the
bank must be promised a fairly large stake in the ﬁrm. Hence, the short term credit
insurance payment has to be relatively large in order to maintain the bank’s incentives
to liquidate and to forego its stake in the ﬁrm.
Consider then management’s decision problem. Since termination threats are
credible, the bank would not be willing to let the ﬁrm continue if management shirked.
Hence, following a downwards deviation from the equilibrium eﬀort level, e < e¤,
management would have to raise the bank’s compensation to induce the bank to
14forego the termination option (in the good state). Management thus oﬀers some
feasible payments R0
H · Π and R0
L · 0 such that the bank is just willing to let the
ﬁrm continue,15
e(R0
H + CH) + (1 ¡ e)(R0
L + CL) = L + C0 (19)
Consequently, for e < e¤, management’s payoﬀ (before taking eﬀort) would be given
by
µ(e(Π + CH) + (1 ¡ e)CL) ¡ µ(L + C0) ¡ Ã(e) (20)
Conversely, for e ¸ e¤, management’s payoﬀ amounts to
µ(e(Π ¡ RH) ¡ (1 ¡ e)RL) ¡ Ã(e) (21)
Note that from (17) management’s payoﬀ function is continuous in e. By concavity,
the equilibrium eﬀort level e¤ is thus incentive compatible if and only if
µ(Π + CH ¡ CL) ¡ Ã0(e¤) ¸ 0 (22)
and
µ(Π ¡ RH + RL) ¡ Ã0(e¤) · 0 (23)
The “downwards” incentive constraint (22) ensures e ¸ e¤, while the “upwards” in-
centive constraint (23) ensures e · e¤. By inspection, the long term credit insurance
payments feed into the “downwards” incentive constraint (22). This is because when
using the termination option as a threat point in renegotiation, the bank’s status quo
payoﬀ, L + C0, does not depend on the long term credit insurance payments. Hence,
the credit insurance payments will be captured by management. As a result, long
term credit insurance may distort performance incentives. In particular, the ﬁrst best
can be implemented only if CH ¸ CL. A large credit insurance payment in the low
cash ﬂow state indirectly rewards management for expending low eﬀort. Intuitively, as
long as the termination threat is credible, management fully internalizes the negative
externality poor performance imposes on the bank’s payoﬀ. However, management
does not internalize any negative externalities imposed on the credit insurer as the
latter is at arm’s length. Hence, as long as the ﬁrm is not full residual claimant with
respect to the credit insurer (CH ¸ CL), management’s claim is diluted. By inspec-
tion, when CH ¸ CL and RH ¸ RL neither incentive constraint is binding at the
ﬁrst best eﬀort level eFB. Hence, provided the bank does not source long term credit
insurance (formally CH < CL) and termination threats are credible, the ﬁrst best is
achievable.
Optimal credit insurance: Since the ﬁrm extracts the entire surplus, the optimal
credit and credit insurance contracts maximize the joint surplus subject to the previ-
ously derived constraints. In particular, the ﬁrst best, e¤ = eFB, can be implemented
15This holds true for small deviations from the equilibrium eﬀort level. If management showed very
poor performance, continuation would be ineﬃcient in which case the bank would always liquidate.
We show in the appendix that management’s incentive constraint not to choose such very low eﬀort
levels is not binding.
15if and only if there exist payments (RH;RL) and (P;CH;CL;C0) such that (i) the
payments are feasible, RH · Π and RL · 0, (ii) the liquidation policy is ex post
eﬃcient (at the equilibrium eﬀort level) and incentive compatible, L+C0 ¸ RL+CL,
RH + CH ¸ RL + CL, and
C0 = eFBCH + (1 ¡ eFB)CL +
I + c ¡ L
µ
; (24)
(iii) the bank and the credit insurer break even in equilibrium, and (iv) the incentive
constraints (22) and (23) are satisﬁed at the ﬁrst best performance level, CH ¸ CL
and RH ¸ RL.
A particularly appealing contract that implements the ﬁrst best is pure short term
credit insurance, CL = CH = 0. From (18), the short term credit insurance payment
amounts to
C0 =
I + c ¡ L
µ
(25)
The premium the bank pays to the credit insurer is thus given by
P = (1 ¡ µ)
I + c ¡ L
µ
(26)
For the bank to break even (and to satisfy the other constraints), standard debt will
be ﬁne. Hence, RL = 0 and, from the bank’s break even constraint,
RH =
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
µeFB (27)
We are ready to claim the following
Proposition 2 An optimal credit insurance contract stipulates that the bank receives
short term credit insurance but no long term credit insurance. In the bad state, the
bank liquidates, seizes the ﬁrm’s assets and receives a payment C0 = (I + c ¡ L)=µ
from the credit insurer. In the good state, the ﬁrm is continued. Management expends
ﬁrst best eﬀort.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that short term credit insurance enhances the bank’s
incentives to intervene which in turn strengthens management’s incentives to per-
form. In contrast, long term credit insurance will impede managerial incentives as
long as management is not full residual claimant with respect to the credit insurer,
i.e. CH ¸ CL. As was stressed earlier, the distortion long term credit insurance im-
poses on management’s incentives does not stem from the bank’s weakened incentives
to intervene but from a dilution eﬀect.
The optimal contracts are easily matched with securities used in practice. It
suﬃces to specify a short term debt payment
R =
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
µeFB (28)
which matures at t = 2. As the ﬁrm cannot fulﬁll its payment obligation at this stage,
it must default. This constitutes the credit event. The bank has then the choice be-
tween liquidating the ﬁrm (and collecting the short term credit insurance payment) or
16letting the ﬁrm continue (and not collecting the short term credit insurance payment).
If the bank decides to liquidate it receives L from liquidating the ﬁrm’s assets and a
payment
C0 =
I + c ¡ L
µ
(29)
from the credit insurer. Hence, in total, the bank receives
L + C0 =
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
µ
(30)
in liquidation. If the bank does not liquidate, it receives no payment from the credit
insurer and short term debt is rolled over. Hence, the bank’s payoﬀ from not liqui-
dating after having received the good signal is given by
eR = e
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
µeFB (31)
and 0 after having received the bad signal. The bank thus liquidates in the bad state.
In the good state, it lets the ﬁrm continue if and only if
eR = e
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
µeFB ¸
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
µ
= L + C0 (32)
or e ¸ eFB. For small deviations from eFB, the bank uses the liquidation option as a
threat point in order to extract a higher payment from the ﬁrm. Given this penalty,
management is incentivized to expend the ﬁrst best eﬀort level. Summarizing, a ﬁ-
nancial structure with short term debt and short term credit insurance implements
the ﬁrst best. As was discussed earlier, long term credit insurance would undermine
the incentive eﬃciency of this ﬁnancial structure. This will be addressed in more
detail next.
The costs of long term credit insurance: What is the eﬃciency loss stemming
from long term credit insurance? Suppose the bank receives partial long term credit
insurance. Formally, normalize CH and RL to zero and express CL as a fraction of
outstanding long term debt, CL = ÁRH, where Á 2 (0;1]. In order to incentivize the
bank to intervene, we must have
C0 = (1 ¡ e¤)ÁRH +
I + c ¡ L
µ
(33)
In other words, in order to maintain the bank’s incentives to intervene, short term
credit insurance has to be increased if long term credit insurance is granted too. The
bank’s long term debt claim in the ﬁrm is aﬀected by long term credit insurance only
through its eﬀects on management’s incentives. Hence,
RH =
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
µe¤ (34)
The long term credit insurance payment is thus given by
CL = Á
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
µe¤ > 0 (35)
17Suppose the “upwards” incentive constraint (23) is not binding. Then, the “down-
wards” incentive constraint (22) must be binding.16 Thus, the equilibrium eﬀort level
is given by the largest solution of
µΠ ¡ Á
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
e¤ ¡ Ã0(e¤) = 0 (36)
Note then that the “upwards” incentive constraint (23) is indeed not binding, as
µ(Π ¡ RH) · µ(Π ¡ ÁRH) = Ã0(e¤).
The incentive constraint (36) shows that long term credit insurance distorts man-
agement’s incentives by diluting its claim. In particular, management will be rewarded
for expending low eﬀort and consequently lacks commitment to work hard. In order
to preserve the bank’s incentives to intervene, the bank has to source more short term
credit insurance. Preserving the bank’s incentives to intervene is in turn worthwhile
as management’s distorted eﬀort level is still above the eﬀort level under the no credit
insurance regime. Formally, comparing the incentive constraint under partial credit
insurance (36) with the corresponding incentive constraint under no credit insurance
(10), demonstrates that management has better incentives to perform under partial
long term credit insurance than under the no credit insurance regime. In the limit,
as the bank’s long term claim becomes fully insured, the beneﬁts of short term credit
insurance evaporate, and we are back to the case of no credit insurance.
Proposition 3 Suppose the bank sources long term credit insurance. Then, in or-
der to maintain incentives to intervene the bank has to source more short term credit
insurance. Even when intervention incentives are maintained, long term credit insur-
ance will worsen the ﬁrm’s performance. In the limit, as the bank’s long term claim
becomes fully insured, the incentive eﬀects of short term credit insurance evaporate.
If the bank sources long term credit insurance, it can preserve its incentives to in-
tervene by sourcing more short term credit insurance. Long term credit insurance
nevertheless distorts management’s incentives to perform. In particular, the incentive
eﬀects of short term credit insurance vanish when the bank’s long term claim becomes
fully insured. It is important to stress that this eﬃciency loss does not stem from the
bank’s reduced incentives to intervene (these are maintained by sourcing more short
term credit insurance), but from diluting management’s claim.
In our setting, long term credit insurance impedes eﬃciency. This would be dif-
ferent if default on long term debt or exposure to long term credit risk imposed
deadweight costs on the bank, stemming, for example, from the bank’s own ﬁnanc-
ing constraints, bankruptcy deadweight costs, or regulatory capital constraints. One
could easily extend the setting to allow for such deadweight costs. The parties would
have to trade oﬀ the beneﬁts of long term credit insurance with its costs. The ben-
eﬁts stem from reducing the deadweight costs that default or exposure to credit risk
impose on the bank. These beneﬁts are passed on to the borrower. The costs stem
16Formally, suppose the “downwards” incentive constraint is not binding. Then, e
¤ = e
FB, which
from CH < CL would violate the “downwards” incentive constraint.
18from diluting the borrower’s claim. As soon as the deadweight costs of default become
very large, the bank takes full insurance against long term default risk. The incentive
eﬀects of short term credit insurance would vanish in the limit.
4 Incentives to Monitor
Suppose the bank cannot commit to monitor. At t = 2, the bank thus has to contem-
plate whether to inspect the ﬁrm at a cost c or whether to leave the ﬁrm unmonitored.
If the bank expends c and monitors, it will be able to observe both the interim signal
and management’s prior decision making. If it does not monitor, it will not observe
anything and the ﬁrm will be continued even in the bad state.17 Thus, the bank has
incentives to monitor if and only if continuation in the bad state is suﬃciently costly
for the bank.
No credit insurance: Suppose ﬁrst that the bank does not source credit insurance.
If the bank monitors, given management’s equilibrium eﬀort e¤¤, it derives a payoﬀ of
µ(e¤¤RH + (1 ¡ e¤¤)RL) + (1 ¡ µ)L ¡ c (37)
If the bank does not monitor, management continues the ﬁrm in the bad state. Hence,
the bank’s payoﬀ is given by
µe¤¤RH + (1 ¡ e¤¤)RL + (1 ¡ µ)RL (38)
The monitoring incentive constraint thus reads




By inspection, the monitoring incentive constraint is not binding at the optimum
(RL = 0) if and only if L ¸ c=(1¡µ), i.e. the likelihood of the bad state is suﬃciently
large, the monitoring cost is suﬃciently small, and/or assets have suﬃcient collateral
value. Note that (1 ¡ µ)L ¡ c is the direct (ex ante) surplus gain from monitoring.
In other words, the monitoring incentive constraint is not binding if and only if the
direct surplus gain from monitoring is non–negative.
If the monitoring incentive constraint is violated at RL = 0, the parties have to
contemplate which of following two options to adopt (all other options are obviously
suboptimal, as long as the bank does not source credit insurance): (i) RL = 0 and leave
the ﬁrm unmonitored; (ii) ﬁx RL such that the bank just has suﬃcient incentives to
monitor. Let e¤¤(0) denote the equilibrium eﬀort level if the bank does not monitor.





¡ Ã0(e¤¤(0)) = 0 (40)
17Recall that if the bank does not monitor, then the decision whether to terminate or to continue
is up to management. However, management would never self liquidate the ﬁrm.
19The surplus (and, hence, the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ) amounts to
µe¤¤(0)Π ¡ I ¡ Ã(e¤¤(0)) (41)
Let e¤¤(1) denote the equilibrium eﬀort level if the bank monitors. Under the second







¡ Ã0(e¤¤(1)) = 0 (42)
Comparing (42) with the corresponding incentive constraint when the bank can com-
mit to monitor,
µΠ ¡
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
e¤¤ ¡ Ã0(e¤¤) = 0 (43)
reveals that lack of commitment to monitor will distort management’s incentives,
stemming from the distortion of the ﬁnancial contract needed to incentivize the bank
to monitor.18 The surplus is given by
µe¤¤(1)Π + (1 ¡ µ)L ¡ c ¡ I ¡ Ã(e¤¤(1)) (44)
By inspection, when (1¡µ)L < c, ﬁxing RL in order to incentivize the bank to monitor
results in a direct surplus decrease, and moreover, weakens management’s performance
incentives. The same conclusion holds when the bank can commit to monitor. While
in this case there is no need to distort the ﬁnancial contract in order to commit the
bank to monitor, monitoring is nevertheless ineﬃcient if the direct surplus gain from
monitoring is negative. We thus have the following
Proposition 4 Suppose the bank does not source credit insurance. Then, no matter
whether the bank can commit to monitor or not, under an optimal contract the bank
will monitor if and only if the direct surplus increase from monitoring is non–negative,
(1 ¡ µ)L ¸ c.
When the bank does not source credit insurance, termination threats imposed on man-
agement lack disciplinary power. Hence, the beneﬁts of monitoring stem solely from
ensuring eﬃcient liquidation decisions. This implies that the bank should monitor if
and only if the direct surplus gain from monitoring, (1 ¡ µ)L ¡ c, is non–negative. If
the direct surplus gain from monitoring is negative, monitoring will adversely aﬀect
management’s incentives by increasing the outside ﬁnancing burden. When the bank
cannot commit to monitor, there will be an additional eﬀect in that the parties have
to distort the ﬁnancial contract to incentivize the bank to monitor. This will distort
management’s incentives even further. Conversely, if the direct surplus gain is posi-
tive, the monitoring incentive constraint is not binding. In this case, there is no need
to distort the ﬁnancial contract in order to induce the bank to monitor.
These observations have an important implication for the role of credit insurance
in our framework: As long as restoring the bank’s monitoring incentives does not al-
low to improve managerial performance incentives, sourcing credit insurance in order
18Formally, if c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L > 0 we have I +
c¡(1¡µ)L




20to aﬀect the bank’s monitoring incentives is pointless. Monitoring to prevent manage-
ment from continuing in the bad state is either eﬃcient or ineﬃcient. In the former
case, the monitoring incentive constraint is not binding in the absence of credit in-
surance. In the latter case, the bank should not expend the monitoring cost, as long
as a threat to respond to shirking with liquidation lacks credibility. In other words,
restoring monitoring incentives by sourcing credit insurance or altering the bank’s ﬁ-
nancial claim is worthwhile only if monitoring allows to restore managerial incentives
to perform.
Credit insurance: The previous discussion shows that incentivizing the bank to
monitor is worthwhile only if doing so allows to improve managerial performance in-
centives. Let e¤ denote management’s equilibrium eﬀort level when the bank commits
itself to monitor. The surplus under monitoring amounts to
µe¤Π + (1 ¡ µ)L ¡ I ¡ c ¡ Ã(e¤) (45)
Under the no monitoring regime, the surplus is given by
µe¤¤(0)Π ¡ I ¡ Ã(e¤¤(0)) (46)
where e¤¤(0) < e¤ · eFB. Hence, monitoring will be ex ante eﬃcient if and only if
(1 ¡ µ)L ¡ c +
Z e¤
e¤¤(0)
(µΠ ¡ Ã0(e)) de ¸ 0 (47)
which may hold even if (1 ¡ µ)L < c (i.e. when monitoring would be ineﬃcient if
the bank did not source credit insurance). We assume that (47) holds at the ﬁrst
best eﬀort level, e¤ = eFB. Hence, if there exists a contract such that (i) the bank
has suﬃcient incentives to monitor, given that management sticks to ﬁrst best eﬀort
level, and (ii) management expends ﬁrst best eﬀort, given that the bank monitors,
the contract is optimal. In what follows, we derive such a contract.
Fix management’s equilibrium eﬀort level e¤. If the bank monitors, it derives a
payoﬀ of
µ(e¤(RH + CH) + (1 ¡ e¤)(RL + CL)) + (1 ¡ µ)(L + C0) ¡ c (48)
Conversely, if the bank does not monitor, its payoﬀ amounts to
µ(e¤(RH + CH) + (1 ¡ e¤)(RL + CL)) + (1 ¡ µ)(RL + CL) (49)
If the bank monitors, it captures L + C0 in the bad state. If it does not monitor,
the ﬁrm is continued and hence it obtains RL +CL in the bad state. The monitoring
incentive constraint thus amounts to




By inspection, the bank has an incentive to monitor if (i) assets have high collateral
value, (ii) the short term credit insurance payment is large, (iii) the bank receives little
21(or even a negative amount) in the low cash ﬂow state when the ﬁrm is continued,
(iv) the monitoring cost is small, and/or (v) the likelihood of the bad state is not too
small. In particular, as µ approaches one, a pure strategy equilibrium with monitoring
no longer exists. This stems from the fact that the only reason that the bank would
monitor at this stage is to prevent management from continuing in the bad state. In
contrast, management’s eﬀort is already sunk. In particular, there is no reason to
incur the monitoring cost to verify that management indeed exerted the equilibrium
eﬀort level.19
The monitoring incentive constraint (50) reveals that smart contract design can
improve the bank’s incentives to monitor. In particular, increasing the left hand
side (L + C0) and decreasing the right hand side (RL + CL) relax the monitoring
incentive constraint. This suggests that short term credit insurance strengthens the
bank’s incentives to monitor, while long term credit insurance weakens monitoring
incentives.
In order for the bank to use the termination option as a threat point in renegoti-
ation if and only if management shirks, we must have
C0 = e¤CH + (1 ¡ e¤)CL +
I + c ¡ L
µ
; (51)
RH + CH ¸ RL + CL, and L + C0 ¸ RL + CL. We will ﬁrst determine under
which condition the monitoring incentive constraint is not binding when employing a
standard debt contract and sourcing the optimal amount of short term credit insurance
(but no long term credit insurance).20 Thus, let RL = 0 and
C0 =
I + c ¡ L
µ
(52)
Substituting RL = 0, CH = CL = 0, and C0 into (50) and rearranging terms, the
monitoring incentive constraint reduces to




As the left hand side is strictly positive, the monitoring incentive constraint is not
binding as long as the monitoring cost c is suﬃciently small or the likelihood of the
bad state is suﬃcient large, µ · 1=2. In the latter case, the bank has incentives to
monitor in order to prevent management from continuing in the bad state, no matter
how large the monitoring cost. The intuition is that while the bank expends c when
19Since management by deﬁnition sticks to the equilibrium eﬀort level in equilibrium and monitoring
is costly, it is a best response for the bank not to monitor (if the likelihood of the bad state is zero).
Hence, in a pure strategy equilibrium, the bank would not monitor. However, as has been suggested by
the auditing literature (see e.g. Choe 1998, Khalil 1998, and Mookherjee and Png 1989, for details.),
a mixed strategy equilibrium with monitoring might exist (more precisely, an optimal contract might
exist that implements a mixed strategy equilibrium with monitoring). We restrict attention to pure
strategy equilibria for two reasons. First, the additional economic insights of mixed strategy equilibria
will be limited. Second, as will be shown below, in our framework there almost always exists a pure
strategy equilibrium with monitoring.
20Thus, the incentive compatibility constraints under the ﬁrst best, RH +CH ¸ RL+CL, L+C0 ¸
RL + CL, Π ¡ Ã
0(e
FB) ¸ 0, and Π ¡ RH ¡ Ã
0(e
FB) · 0 are satisﬁed.
22monitoring, the monitoring cost also shows up in the short term credit insurance
payment through the bank’s claim on the ﬁrm.21 If the bank monitors, it expends c
but recaptures c=µ with probability 1 ¡ µ. Hence, for c · (1 ¡ µ) £ c=µ or µ · 1=2,
the monitoring constraint is not binding. We have the following
Proposition 5 Suppose that monitoring and investment are eﬃcient. Then, for any
µ < 1, there exists a critical threshold c0 > 0 such that for any monitoring cost c · c0
the bank monitors and management expends the ﬁrst best eﬀort level under standard
debt and short term credit insurance.
As long as (53) holds, there is no need to give the bank further incentives to monitor
by raising the bank’s cost of not preventing management from continuing in the bad
state. However, if (53) is violated, standard short term debt and short term credit
insurance are no longer suﬃcient to guarantee monitoring incentive compatibility. In
this case, the parties have two options: they can either reduce RL (and increase RH)
or reduce CL (and increase CH or reduce P). Both options will increase the riskiness
of the bank’s claim. Intuitively, to maintain the bank’s incentives to monitor, the
bank has to incur a substantial loss in the low cash ﬂow state if it leaves the ﬁrm
ummonitored. Hence, the bank’s payoﬀ in the low cash ﬂow state, RL + CL, should
be as small a possible. Most generally, an optimal contract maximizes the surplus
µe¤Π + (1 ¡ µ)L ¡ Ã(e¤) ¡ I ¡ c (54)
with respect to e¤, CH, CL, RH, and RL, subject to the monitoring incentive constraint
(50), RH + CH ¸ RL + CL, and L + C0 ¸ RL + CL (where C0 is given by (51)), the
managerial incentive constraints,
µ(Π + CH ¡ CL) ¡ Ã0(e¤) ¸ 0 (55)
and
µ(Π ¡ RH + RL) ¡ Ã0(e¤) · 0 (56)
the limited liability constraints RH · Π and RL · 0, and the bank’s (binding) break
even constraint,
µ(e¤RH + (1 ¡ e¤)RL) + (1 ¡ µ)L = I + c (57)
(the payments from and to the credit insurer cancel out). By inspection, an increase
in RH and CH and a decrease in CL relax the managerial incentive constraints, the
monitoring incentive constraint, RH + CH ¸ RL + CL, and L + C0 ¸ RL + CL. We
can thus claim the following
21A similar intuition explains why an increase in the collateral value L tightens the monitoring
incentive constraint. This stems from the fact that in order to satisfy the intervention incentive
compatibility constraint the bank must be indiﬀerent between exercising the liquidation option (and
capturing L + C0) and the continuation option (and capturing eRH) at the equilibrium eﬀort level.
Since in equilibrium the bank captures L in the bad state, RH will be decreasing in the collateral
value, and hence L + C0 must be decreasing in L.
23Proposition 6 For any monitoring cost c and µ < 1 such that monitoring and in-
vestment are eﬃcient, there exist optimal credit and credit insurance contracts with
ﬁnite payments that implement a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in
which management expends the ﬁrst best eﬀort level, the bank monitors, and the ﬁrm
is continued in the good state and liquidated in the bad state.
The proposition demonstrates that the bank’s potential lack of monitoring incentives
can be addressed with an appropriate credit contract and an appropriate “credit
insurance” policy. In particular, the bank receives full short term credit insurance in
order to maintain its incentives to intervene should it monitor and should management
shirk. However, as soon as µ becomes large, the bank will pay an amount to the credit
insurer in the low cash ﬂow state and the credit insurer will pay an amount to the
bank in the high cash ﬂow state (see below). Hence, in order to commit itself to
monitor, the bank has to sell “credit insurance” to the third party: it has to increase
the risk of its stake in the ﬁrm. In particular, the bank has to be penalized for not
monitoring by incurring a large loss in the low cash ﬂow state. This makes leaving the
ﬁrm unmonitored costly for the bank, and hence it will monitor in order to prevent
management from continuing in the bad state. As a side eﬀect, the bank is also able
to punish management should it observe that management shirked. This latter eﬀect
does not explain why the bank expends the monitoring cost. This is because eﬀort is
sunk at the monitoring stage and, by deﬁnition, management sticks to the equilibrium
eﬀort level in equilibrium. Rather, it explains why the parties envision a mechanism
that commits the bank to monitor.
In practice, the optimal contracts can be implemented with short term debt to be
rolled over if the ﬁrm defaults at t = 2, short term credit insurance, and the bank
committing to make a payment to the credit insurer should the ﬁrm at t = 3 default
on its debt. In exchange, the credit insurer would commit to make a payment to the
bank should the ﬁrm not default. For example, let
CL = ¡
eFB
1 ¡ eFBCH ´ C¤
L; (58)
C0 =
I + c ¡ L
µ
; (59)
RL = 0, and consider a short term debt claim
R =
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
µeFB (60)
to be rolled over if the ﬁrm defaults at t = 2 and is not liquidated (in which case the














22It is easily veriﬁed that RH+CH ¸ RL+CL and L+C0 ¸ RL+CL are implied by the monitoring
incentive constraint. Hence, neither constraint is binding.
24As long as (53) holds, the monitoring incentive constraint won’t be binding at CH =
CL = 0. Suppose instead that (53) is violated. Let then CH = C¤
H > 0 and CL = C¤
L <
0. The bank thus commits itself to monitor by promising the credit insurer a payment
in the low cash ﬂow state (and the credit insurer promising a payment to the bank in
the high cash ﬂow state). In other words, incentives to monitor are restored by reverse
credit insurance. Such an arrangement can actually be interpreted as a balance–sheet
securitization in which the bank sells (all or part of) its long term claim to third party
investors, provides loss protection, and is paid a fee for its monitoring and credit
enhancement services, provided the ﬁrm does not default at t = 3. In exchange for
this fee, the bank would sell its claim at a discount. This structure resembles small
business loan securitization arrangements used in practice (see Beshouri and Nigro
1994).
Alternatively, one could alter the bank’s ﬁnancial claim on the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows
in order to restore monitoring incentives. For the bank to have incentives to monitor,
it should have a small (or even negative) claim in the low cash ﬂow state (and,
consequently, a large claim in the high cash ﬂow state). Thus, the bank would receive
less in the low cash ﬂow state and more in the high cash ﬂow state. This is to be
interpreted as equity ﬁnancing.23 As long as a termination threat is credible, altering
the bank’s claim in this way has no impact on management’s incentives.
Two caveats are in order. First, note that as soon as the likelihood of the bad state
becomes small, the riskiness of the bank’s and the credit insurer’s respective claims
becomes very large. In particular, as µ approaches one, CL approaches minus inﬁnity
while CH approaches plus inﬁnity. For obvious reasons, such large payments may not
be feasible in practice. Capital constraints and each parties’ risk taking capacity and
willingness may thus put an upper bound on the feasible transfer payments. As a
result, the ﬁrst best may not be achievable. Second, if volatility imposes deadweight
costs on the bank, the mechanism may well be too costly. While increasing the
riskiness of the bank’s long term claim allows to restore the bank’s incentives to
monitor, the burden put on the surplus might be too high.
Nevertheless, the analysis put forward in this section has important implications
for the merits of short term and long term credit insurance: (i) short term credit
insurance strengthens incentives to monitor, incentives to intervene, and managerial
incentives to perform; (ii) long term credit insurance weakens incentives to monitor
and managerial incentives to perform; (iii) increasing the riskiness of the bank’s long
term claims, through equity ﬁnancing or reverse credit insurance, allows to restore
monitoring incentives if needed.
23Note that equity ﬁnancing is feasible (and meaningful) in our setting, despite the fact that income
in the low cash ﬂow state is zero. It suﬃces that the bank makes an initial cash transfer larger than
the initial investment outlay. Under debt ﬁnancing, the bank would extract the ﬁrm’s cash balance
in the low cash ﬂow state, but not under equity ﬁnancing.
255 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that credit derivatives can strengthen banks’ incentives to
monitor and to intervene. In particular, credit derivatives with short term maturity
tend to enhance a bank’s incentives to “pull the plug” by shifting the balance be-
tween what the bank has to lose and what it has to gain from doing so towards the
beneﬁt side. This is beneﬁcial in order to harden a borrower’s budget constraint and
improve managerial performance incentives. While the bank’s intervention incentives
are strengthened, the credit insurer’s break even constraint ensures that the bank
won’t have excessive incentives to liquidate the borrower. Credit derivatives with
short term maturity thus introduce an additional degree of freedom, which allows to
optimize the balance between too soft and excessive incentives to intervene.
Long term credit insurance worsens monitoring and intervention incentives, ceteris
paribus. However, intervention incentives can be maintained by sourcing more short
term credit insurance. Nevertheless, long term credit insurance worsens managerial
incentives by diluting management’s claim on the ﬁrm. Thus, as long as default on
long term ﬁnancial claims does not impose deadweight costs on the bank, long term
credit insurance only tends to impede eﬃciency.
Our analysis departs from much of the bank monitoring literature in that mon-
itoring refers to gathering information about a ﬁrm’s decision making and external
inﬂuences aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s prospects (rather than enhancing long term ﬁrm value).
Monitoring thus diﬀers from intervention, which refers to using the information ob-
tained through monitoring. Opening up the monitoring “black box” in this way is
essential to our ﬁndings that short term credit insurance improves monitoring and
intervention incentives. The bank’s role in terms of enhancing ﬁrm value through
providing management with advice or interfering with management’s decision making
is limited in our setting. The role of running the ﬁrm is left to management. Still,
in practice, banks sometimes provide managerial advice and interfere with decision
making. Long term credit insurance would impede banks’ incentives to engage in such
actions, as it reduces the bank’s risk exposure to long term value. Conversely, short
term credit insurance would have little impact on the bank’s incentives to enhance
long term value.24
The analysis relies crucially on the absence of renegotiation between the bank and
parties providing credit insurance. Credit derivatives constitute a ﬁnancial instrument
that enhances the parties’ commitment not to engage in renegotiation. This is because
counterparties in credit derivatives transactions are typically at arm’s length and
banks may acquire credit derivatives from a large number of counterparties.25 Both
features tend to render renegotiation prohibitively costly. Credit derivatives diﬀer
from other risk transfer instruments, such as loan sales, in another important respect.
Credit derivatives can be structured in terms of maturity. As a result, banks can
24Short term credit insurance would strengthen bank’s incentives to enhance long term value if
bank advice and decision making and managerial decision making were strategic complements.
25As such, credit derivatives diﬀer crucially from single–party credit insurance.
26protect themselves against short term credit risk, while still being exposed to long
term credit risk.26 This is diﬀerent from e.g. a loan sale, where the bank reduces its
long term risk exposure. It is thus interesting to note that credit derivatives typically
exhibit shorter maturities than the maturities of the underlying assets (see Duﬀee and
Zhou 2001 and the references mentioned there).
This paper brings together two elements of the policy debate about the economic
eﬀects of credit derivatives. On the one hand, it is commonly alleged that insurance
against credit risk worsens banks’ incentives to monitor loans. On the other hand,
many market observers express fears that banks that enjoy credit protection are un-
willing to engage in restructuring. Rather, they prefer driving their borrowers into
default and liquidation, and collecting the credit insurance payments. Our analysis
demonstrates that strengthening banks’ incentives to be tough in restructuring is ben-
eﬁcial in order to commit borrowers to perform better. Moreover, enhancing banks’
bargaining position in debt restructuring is a prerequisite for banks to have incentives
to monitor loans and to play a meaningful role in restructuring. Our ﬁndings sug-
gest that banks’ increased incentive to “pull the plug” does not result in an increased
number of defaults, to the contrary, it improves ﬁrm performance and hence reduces
default risk.
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 1: See the discussion in the text.
Proof of proposition 1: In order to complete the proof, we have to show that the ﬁrst best eﬀort level
and the equilibrium eﬀort level exist and are unique and interior. Consider the ﬁrst best eﬀort level
e
FB, given by the solution of µΠ ¡ Ã
0(e) = 0. Since Ã(0) = Ã
0(0) = 0, lime!1 Ã
0(e) = 1, µΠ > 0,
and Ã
0(e) is strictly increasing and continuous, e
FB exists, is unique and interior. Next, consider the
equilibrium eﬀort level, characterized by the following incentive constraint,
'(e) = µΠ ¡
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
e
¡ Ã
0(e) = 0 (62)
Note that lime!0 '(e) = lime!1 '(e) ! ¡1. Moreover, if outside ﬁnancing is feasible, '(e) = 0
must have a generic solution, i.e. max'(e) > 0. Since I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L > 0 and Ã
0(e) is increasing,
any such solution will be inferior to the ﬁrst best eﬀort level. Hence, the optimal solution e
¤¤ is given
by the largest interior solution of '(e) = 0.
Proof of proposition 2: Note ﬁrst that the limited liability constraints RH · Π and RL · 0 and the
liquidation incentive compatibility constraints L + C0 ¸ RL + CL and RH + CH ¸ RL + CL are
not binding. We have shown in the text that e
FB maximizes management’s payoﬀ function around
e
FB. In order to complete the proof, we will have to show that e
FB is the global maximizer of
management’s payoﬀ function. Consider an upwards deviation e ¸ e
FB. Management’s payoﬀ would
be given by
µe(Π ¡ RH) ¡ Ã(e) (63)
which from RH > 0, µ(Π ¡ RH) < Ã
0(e
FB), and e ¸ e
FB is maximized at e
FB. Next, consider a
downwards deviation e · e
FB. The bank will be willing to forego the termination option in exchange
for raising its compensation as long as the limited liability constraint in renegotiation (R
0
H · Π) is









the bank would liquidate even in the good state in which case management would end up with a
payoﬀ of ¡Ã(e). Hence, for e < e
0, management optimally expends zero eﬀort and thus achieves a
payoﬀ of zero. For e 2 [e
0;e
FB] (note that e
FB > e
0 since investing is eﬃcient), management derives
a payoﬀ of
µeΠ ¡ (I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L) ¡ Ã(e) (65)
which is maximized at e
FB since µΠ ¡ Ã
0(e
FB) = 0. Hence, for e · e




FBΠ + (1 ¡ µ)L ¡ (I + c) ¡ Ã(e
FB) > 0 (66)
Thus, e
FB is the global maximizer of management’s payoﬀ.
29Proof of proposition 3: In order to complete the proof, we will have show that the optimal eﬀort level
is indeed the largest solution of
'(e) = µΠ ¡ Á
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
e
¡ Ã
0(e) = 0 (67)
For this, a similar argument as made in the proof of proposition 1 suﬃces. Then, since e
¤ is the




¤) < 0. Thus, from the implicit function theorem, e
¤ is strictly decreasing in Á.
Moreover, as Á ! 1, we have
µΠ ¡
I + c ¡ (1 ¡ µ)L
e¤ ¡ Ã
0(e
¤) = 0 (68)
Hence, limÁ!1 e
¤ = e
¤¤, namely, the equilibrium eﬀort level under the no credit insurance regime.
Proof of proposition 4: See the discussion in the text.
Proof of proposition 5: Follows from (53) and the discussion in the text.
Proof of proposition 6: See the discussion in the text for an example.
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International Center FAME - Partner Institutions 
 
 
The University of Geneva 
The University of Geneva, originally known as the Academy of Geneva, was founded in 1559 by Jean Calvin 
and Theodore de Beze.  In 1873, The Academy of Geneva became the University  of Geneva with the 
creation of a medical school.  The Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences was created in 1915.  The 
university is now composed of seven faculties of science; medicine; arts; law; economic and social sciences; 
psychology; education, and theology.  It also includes a school of translation and interpretation; an institute of 
architecture; seven interdisciplinary centers and six associated institutes. 
 
More than 13’000 students, the majority being foreigners, are enrolled in the various programs from the 
licence to high-level doctorates. A staff of more than 2’500 persons (professors, lecturers and assistants) is 
dedicated to the transmission and advancement of scientific knowledge through teaching as well as 
fundamental and applied research. The University of Geneva has been able to preserve the ancient European 
tradition of an academic community located in the heart of the city. This favors not only interaction between 
students, but also their integration in the population and in their participation of the particularly rich artistic and 
cultural life. http://www.unige.ch 
 
The University of Lausanne 
Founded as an academy in 1537, the University of Lausanne (UNIL) is a modern institution of higher 
education and advanced research.  Together with the neighboring Federal Polytechnic Institute of Lausanne, 
it comprises vast facilities and extends its influence beyond the city and the canton into regional, national, and 
international spheres. 
 
Lausanne is a comprehensive university composed of seven Schools and Faculties: religious studies; law; arts; 
social and political sciences; business; science and medicine. With its 9’000 students, it is a medium-sized 
institution able to foster contact between students and professors as well as to encourage interdisciplinary 
work. The five humanities faculties and the science faculty are situated on the shores of Lake Leman in the 
Dorigny plains, a magnificent area of forest and fields that may have inspired the landscape depicted in 
Brueghel the Elder's masterpiece, the Harvesters.  The institutes and various centers of the School of 
Medicine are grouped around the hospitals in the center of Lausanne. The Institute of Biochemistry is located 
in Epalinges, in the northern hills overlooking the city. http://www.unil.ch 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies is a teaching and research institution devoted to the study of 
international relations at the graduate level. It was founded in 1927 by Professor William Rappard to 
contribute through scholarships to the experience of international co-operation which the establishment of the 
League of Nations in Geneva represented at that time. The Institute is a self-governing foundation closely 
connected with, but independent of, the University of Geneva. 
 
The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its international 
character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the approximately 650 
students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further emphasized by the use 
of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which draws upon the methods of  
economics, history, law, and political science  -reflects its aim to provide a broad approach and in-depth 
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